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Abstract. As far as we know, the literature on secure computation
from cut-and-choose has focused on achieving computational security
against malicious adversaries. It is unclear whether the idea of cut-and-
choose can be adapted to secure computation with information-theoretic
security.
In this work we explore the possibility of using cut-and-choose in in-
formation theoretic setting for secure three-party computation (3PC).
Previous work on 3PC has mainly focus on the semi-honest case, and is
motivated by the observation that real-word deployments of multi-party
computation (MPC) seem to involve few parties. We propose a new pro-
tocol for information-theoretically secure 3PC tolerating one malicious
party with cheating probability 2−s using s runs of circuit computation
in the cut-and-choose paradigm. The computational cost of our protocol
is essentially only a small constant worse than that of state-of-the-art
3PC protocols against a semi-honest corruption, while its communica-
tion round is greatly reduced compared to other maliciously secure 3PC
protocols in information-theoretic setting.
1 Introduction
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) allows a set of parties to compute a
function of their joint inputs without revealing anything beyond the fuction out-
put. During the past few years, a tremendous amount of attention has been
devoted to making MPC practical, such as [HEKM11] [KSS13]. However, most
of such works have focused on secure two-party computation (2PC). In the
semi-honest setting, it has been shown that Yao’s garbled circuit technique
[Yao86] can yield very efficent protocols for the computation of boolean cir-
cuits [BDNP08,HSS+10,HEKM11,HEK12]. In the malicious setting, the cut-and-
choose technique [LP07] based on Yao’s garbled circuit was used to construct
efficient, constant-round protocols. This technique was further developed in a
large body of subsequent work [Woo07,LPS08,NO09,S+11,LP12,KSS12,HKE13]
[Lin13,MR13,S+13], yielding the fastest protocols for 2PC of Boolean circuits.
Recently, Yao’s garbled circuits are also applied to constructing secure three-
party computation (3PC) against malicious corruptions, with [CKMZ14] and
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2 Zhili Chen
without [MRZ15] the cut-and-choose technique. It appears that the cut-and-
choose technique is naturally used with Yao’s garbled circuits. It is unknown so
far if this idea can be applied to the information-theoretic setting.
Secure three-party computation (3PC) where only one party is corrupted
(honest majority) is an important special case where the least number of parties
is satisfied for achieving information-theoretic security. In this setting, proto-
cols designed with semi-honest security can be significantly more efficient than
their two-party counterparts since they are commonly based on secret sharing
schemes instead of cryptographic operations. To achieve security against mali-
cious adversaries, usually verifiable secret sharing is used, resulting significant
communication complexity and overhead. Existing work includes implementa-
tion and optimization in frameworks such as Sharemind [BLW08], ShareMonad
[LDDAM12,LADM14] .
1.1 Our Contribution
We design a new protocol for 3PC with one malicious corruption from cut-and-
choose in the information-theoretic setting. Unlike the standard approach of
applying cut-and-choose technique for compiling GC-based protocols into mali-
cious 2PC, we show that in the setting of information-theoretically secure 3PC
with one corruption one can also use the cut-and-choose paradigm and achieve
malicious security at a cost similar to semi-honest 3PC constructions.
The communication complexity of our protocol is linear to the depth of the
circuit, just as that of the common methods of information theoretically secure
computations (e.g., the verifiable secret sharing methods). However, through
the application of cut-and-choose, we can significantly reduce the communica-
tion rounds greatly, comparied with the normal methods from verifiable secret
sharing.
In practical applications, our protocol can be converted into one against con-
vert adversaries [Lin13] by fixing the statsitcal parameter s at a small value,
yeilding a faster protocol. For example, if the covert securlty level, where the
protocol ensures that 99.5% of cheats are caught, is sufficient for practical ap-
plication, then fixing s = 8 is good, and the protocol is secure in the presence of
convert adversaries with deterrent  = 1− 2−8.
1.2 Overview of Our Protocol
The high-level idea of our construction is to execute the three-party protocol
against semi-honest adversaries s times in parallel. The transcripts of r ran-
domly selected runs are revealed for verifying the correctness of computation
(i.e., computation verification), while the remaining s− r runs are used for com-
puting the output (i.e., output computation). This is a classical cut-and-choose
paradigm. However, to achieve malicious security, there are two challenges as
follows. First, the randomly selected runs for computation verification should
not use the true input of each party, while those for output computation should.
Otherwise, the privacy and/or correctness of the protocol would be violated.
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Meanwhile, the selection randomness (for using true inputs or not) should be
unknown to any participant party, but can be determined cooperatively by all
the three parties. The reason is that if any party knows this randomness, it can
easily make modification to the output computation runs without being caught
in the cut-and-choose process.
To address the first challenge, in our protocol, we let each party prepare two
versions of input: one is the true input and the other is a random input (i.e.,
a randomly selected string of the same bit length as the true input). Next, let
each party make s copies of its input, with its two versions of input randomly
permuted in each copy. A well-designed circuit is then used to select a proper
input according to a cut-and-choose indicator c for each run. Specifically, if the
jth bit of c is 1, then the true input is selected; otherwise, the random input is
selected (see Fig. 1).
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Fig. 1. Each party generates s copies of permuted inputs with a privately generated
permutation vector. The proper inputs are then computed from these permuted inputs
according to a cut-and-choose indicator.
In order to address the second challenge, the permutation randomness of the
two input versions of each party is privately generated, and unknown to any
other party. Thus, the shared inputs cannot be altered, without being detected,
by any party except its owner. This prevents the malicious party from tampering
the inputs without being caught. Additionally, the cut-and-choose indicator c is
generated by the three parties in a way such that, no individual party knows any-
thing about c, but all of them can determine c cooperatively. This ensures that
any party cannot determine whether a given run is used for computation veri-
fication or output computation and thus cannot falsify the circuit computation
without being caught.
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1.3 Construction
In Section 2, some preliminary topics including the circuit notation, secret shar-
ing, security model are described. In Section 3, the underlying 3PC against
semi-honest adversaries is introduced. Our maliciously secure 3PC from cut-and-
choose is detailed and analyzed in Section 4. Then, some practical considerations
of our protocol is mensioned in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 is the conclusion of
our work.
2 Preliminaries
We let s denote the statistical security parameter, and assume that the computed
function is represented exclusively with XOR and AND gates.
2.1 Circuit Notation
We follow the circuit notation in [BHR12]. Denote a circuit C = (n,m, q, F, S,G),
where n and m are the numbers of input and output wires, respectively, q is the
number of gates, and each gate is indexed by its output wire. Obviously, the
total number of wires in the circuit is n+ q. Let the wire numbering start with
input wires and end with output wires, then the input wires are {1, · · · , n} and
the output wires are {n + q − m + 1, · · · , n + q}. The function F (resp., S)
takes as input a gate index and returns the first (resp., second) input wire to
gate, with a constraint F (g) < S(g) < g for any gate index g. The function G
represents the operation of a given gate, e.g., Gg(0, 1) = 1 if the gate with index
g is an XOR gate. Since we consider circuits with inputs from three parties,
let {ni−1 + 1, · · · , ni} denote the input wires of party Pi for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, with
n0 = 0 and n3 = n.
2.2 XOR Secret Sharing
Our constructions use three-out-of-three XOR secret sharing: the secret x ∈
{0, 1}k is split into three random shares x1, x2 and x3 ∈ {0, 1}k such that
x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3 = x, with Pi holding share xi for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. We denote a share
of x by [x]i = xi and the sharing by [x] = ([x]1, [x]2, [x]3). This sharing is linear:
if [x] and [y] are sharings of x and y respectively, then [x] ⊕ [y] is a sharing of
x⊕y, i.e., [x⊕y] = [x]⊕ [y]. This means, each party Pi (i ∈ {1, 2, 3}) can locally
compute his share of x⊕ y as [x⊕ y]i = [x]i ⊕ [y]i.
It is straight-forward to show that the above secret sharing scheme is infor-
mation theoretically secure given that the shares x1, x2 and x3 are uniformly
chosen (subject to x1⊕x2⊕x3 = x). Reconstructing a sharing [x] is easily done
by having each party Pi announce his share [x]i and taking x = [x]1⊕ [x]2⊕ [x]3.
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2.3 Shamir’s Secret Sharing
Shamir’s secret sharing [Sha79] is a fundamental (t, n)-threshold secret sharing
scheme. The related notions are described as follows.
(t, n)-threshold secret sharing. A secret s is dispersed into n shares in
such a way that any k ≤ t shares give no information on s (i.e., t-privacy),
whereas any k ≥ t+ 1 shares uniquely determine s (i.e., (t+ 1)-reconstruction),
where t, n are integers with 0 ≤ t < n.
In (t, n)-threshold secret sharing, if an adversary obtains at most t shares, he
obtains nothing about the secret. One of the widely used (t, n)-threshold secret
sharing schemes is Shamir’s defined as follows.
Shamir’s (t, n)-threshold Secret Sharing. Let p > n be a prime. Given
integers t, n with 0 ≤ t < n, and α1, α2, ..., αn ∈ Fp being pairwise distinct and
non-zero. Note that p, t, n, α1, α2, ..., αn are public data. Denote the secret by
s ∈ Fp. Select a polynomial f(x) ∈ Fp[X] uniformly at random, conditioned on
deg(f) ≤ t and f(0) = s. The n shares in the secret s are then given as follows:
si = f(αi) ∈ Fp, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
It is proved that Shamir’s secret sharing satisfies t-privacy and (t + 1)-
reconstruction with t+ 1 ≤ n.
Reconstruction of Shamir’s Secret Sharing. Given a set of shares cor-
resonding to C ⊂ {αi|1 ≤ i < n} with |C| = t + 1, the reconstruction of s is as
follows.
First, the polynomial f(x) over F is reconstructed using Lagrange interpola-
tion.
f(x) =
∑
i∈C
f(αi)θi(x) (1)
where θi(x) is the degree t polynomial such that, for all i, j ∈ C, θi(αj) = 0 if
i 6= j and θi(αj) = 1 if i = j, namely,
θi(x) =
∏
α∈C,j 6=i
x− αj
αi − αj (2)
Then, s is the output of function f(x) at x = 0, namely s = f(0).
2.4 Universally Composable (UC) Security
The framework of UC security involves a collection of interactive Turing ma-
chines, and security is defined by comparing a real and ideal interaction among
these machines. In the real interaction, parties cooperatively run a protocol,
while an adversary may corrupt a part of parties. In the ideal interaction, par-
ties run a dummy protocol by sending inputs to and receiving outputs from an
uncorruptable functionality machine, which performs the entire computation on
behalf of the parties. An environment machine is introduced to both real and
ideal interactions, representing anything external to the current protocol execu-
tion. The environment provides all inputs to all parties and reads all outputs
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from them, and can also interact arbitrarily with the adversary (resp. simula-
tor) in the real (resp. ideal) interaction. Security means that the environment
cannot distinguish the real and ideal interactions. At the end of interaction, the
environment output a bit.
Let REAL[Z,A, pi] and IDEAL[Z,S,F ] denote the output of the environment
Z when interacting with adversary A and parties who execute protocol pi, and
when interacting with simulator S and parties run the dummy protocol in the
presence of functionality F , respectively. We say that protocol pi is information-
theoretically secure if for every adversary A with unbounded computation
power attacking the real interaction, there exists a simulator S attacking the
ideal interaction, such that for all environments Z, Eq. (3) holds with negligible
exception.
|Pr[REAL[Z,A, pi] = 1]− Pr[IDEAL[Z,S,F ] = 1]| = 0 (3)
Particularly, we say that perfect security is achieved, or the real view is
perfectly simulated if Eq. (3) holds.
3 3PC in Semi-honest Setting
We use as a basis a 3PC protocol against semi-honest adversaries, a variant of
ITSEC proposed in [CHC15]. Let h(i) = (i − 1)%3 + 1, we have h(i) = i and
h(i+ 3) = h(i) = i, for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Denote the bit value of wire w by δ(w), and
the k-bit string value of wire w by δk(w). The detailed protocol of the variant
ITSEC is illustrated in Fig. 2.
Theorem 1 states the security of the 3PC protocol pisem3PC(P1, P2, P3) in the
semi-honest setting.
Theorem 1. Protocol pisem3PC(P1, P2, P3) is information-theoretically secure in
the presence of a semi-honest adversary corrupting one party.
Proof. Since in protocol pisem3PC(P1, P2, P3), the three parties are symmetric, we
only need to prove the case where one of the parties is corrupted.
Specifically, we show that for every adversary with unbounded computation
power, the environment’s real view based on the interaction with the adversary
and the parties executing the protocol is indistinguishable to the environment’s
simulated view based on the interaction with a simulator and the the parties
calling the functionality.
Without loss of generality, we assume that party P1 is corrupted. For each
phase of the protocol, we simulate the protocol execution as follows:
– Input sharing: Party P1 receives [x3]1 from P3, and [x2]1 from P2. The
two messages can be simulated by two uniformly random bit strings s1 ∈
{0, 1}|x3| and s2 ∈ {0, 1}|x2|, resulting that both real and simulated views
are identical.
Lecture Notes in Computer Science: Authors’ Instructions 7
Protocol pisem3PC(P1, P2, P3)
Input: Party Pi holds input xi ∈ {0, 1}ni−ni−1 with i ∈ {1, 2, 3}
Auxiliary Inputs: Circuit C = (n,m, q, F, S,G) containing exclusively XOR and
AND gates
1. Input sharing:
- For i ∈ {1, 2, 3}:
 Pi generates its input sharing [xi]
 Pi sends [xi]h(i+1) to Ph(i+1), and [xi]h(i+2) to Ph(i+2)
 Pi receives [xh(i−1)]i from Ph(i−1), and [xh(i−2)]i from Ph(i−2)
- Pi holds ([x1]i, [x2]i, [x3]i) for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}
2. Circuit computation:
For g ∈ {n+ 1, · · · , n+ q}: a← F (g), b← S(g)
- If g is XOR gate: For i ∈ {1, 2, 3}: [δ(g)]i ← [δ(a)]i ⊕ [δ(b)]i
- If g is AND gate (see Fig. 3): For i ∈ {1, 2, 3}:
 Pi generates a random bit ri
 Pi sends [δ(a)]i, [δ(b)]i and ri to Ph(i+1)
 Pi receives [δ(a)]h(i−1), [δ(b)]h(i−1) and rh(i−1) from Ph(i−1)
 Pi computes
[δ(g)]i ← [δ(a)]i[δ(b)]i⊕[δ(a)]i[δ(b)]h(i−1)⊕[δ(a)]h(i−1)[δ(b)]i⊕ri⊕rh(i−1)
3. Output construction:
- For g ∈ {n+ q −m+ 1, · · · , n+ q}: For i ∈ {1, 2, 3}:
 Pi sends [δ(g)]i to Ph(i+1) and Ph(i+2)
 Pi receives [δ(g)]h(i−2) from Ph(i−2) and [δ(g)]h(i−1) from Ph(i−1)
 Pi computes δ(g)← [δ(g)]1 ⊕ [δ(g)]2 ⊕ [δ(g)]3
Fig. 2. ITSEC Variant 3PC Protocol
P1
P2 P3
 
1 1 1
([ ( )] ,[ ( )] , )a b r
 
2 2 2
([ ( )] ,[ ( )] , )a b r
 
3 3 3
([ ( )] ,[ ( )] , )a b r
 
3 3 3
([ ( )] ,[ ( )] , )a b r
 
1 1 1
([ ( )] ,[ ( )] , )a b r
 
2 2 2
([ ( )] ,[ ( )] , )a b r
Fig. 3. The Communication Pattern for AND Gate Computation: [δ(a)δ(b)]i =
[δ(a)]i[δ(b)]i⊕ [δ(a)]i[δ(b)]h(i−1)⊕ [δ(a)]h(i−1)[δ(b)]i⊕ ri⊕ rh(i−1) for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Note
that this communication pattern uses no broadcast channels.
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– Circuit computation: This phase can be simulated gate by gate until the
circuit computation is completed. Given a current gate, it is simulated in
terms of its operation as follows.
• XOR: Party P1 sends or receives nothing, so there is nothing to be sim-
ulated.
• AND : Let a and b denote the two input bits to the gate. During the
gate computation, P1 receives [a]3, [b]3 and r3 from P3. From the circuit
computation of the protocol, it is clear that bit shares {[a]k}3k=1 and
{[b]k}3k=1 are independent uniformly random bits merely subject to a =
⊕3k=1[a]k and b = ⊕3k=1[b]k, and r3 is a uniformly generated random
bit. Thus, the three messages can again be simulated by three uniformly
random bits. Both the real and simulated views are also identical.
– Output Construction: Let y ∈ {0, 1}m be the output of the computed
function. P1 receives [y]3 from P3, and [y]2 from P2. Again, these two mes-
sages are uniformly random bit strings subject to y = ⊕3k=1[y]k, and can be
simulated by two uniformly random bit strings t1, t2 ∈ {0, 1}m.
In all phases, we can see that both real and simulated views are identical. We
thus conclude that Protocol pisem3PC is information-theoretically secure against semi-
honest adversaries corrupting one party. 
4 Three-Party Computation from Cut-and-Choose
In this section, we compile the 3PC protocol against semi-honest adversaries
introduced in the previous section into a maliciously secure protocol using the
cut-and-choose paradigm. This is the first time of applying cut-and-choose idea
to the information-theoretic setting as far as we know. Then, the security and
efficiency of the proposed protocol is analyzed.
4.1 The Detailed Protocol
Our 3PC protocol with malicious security can be described in four phases, each
of which is detailed as follows.
Input preparation. Each party Pi (i ∈ {1, 2, 3}) prepares a random input
and its true input. That is, Pi selects a random bit string x
1
i (i.e., random input)
of exactly the same bit length of its true input x0i ∈ {0, 1}ni−ni−1 . Using x0i and
x1i , party Pi generates s copies of inputs. We denote Pi’s jth copy of input by
a 2-tuple Iij = (x
σij
i , x
1−σij
i ) with permutation bit σij ∈ {0, 1}. In the copy Iij ,
if σij = 0, the true input x
0
i is placed in the first field; otherwise, it is placed
in the second field. Let Ii = (Ii,1, · · · , Ii,s) denote Pi’s set of inputs, with a
random permutation vector σi = (σi,1, · · · , σi,s) chosen by Pi. Note that this
permutation vector is only know to the owner of the inputs, but unknown to
other parties. This prevents other parties from modifying the true inputs but
leaving the random inputs untouched.
Then, Pi prepares the sharing of his input [Ii] = ([Ii,1], · · · , [Ii,s]), where
[Ii,j ] = ([x
σi,j
i ], [x
1−σi,j
i ]), and sends two of the shares to the other two parties,
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one for each party. After that, Pi selects a random bit string ci = {0, 1}s as
a share of the cut-and-choose indicator c, i.e., [c]i = ci, where the jth bit of c
indicates whether the jth run uses true inputs (bit 0) or random inputs (bit 1).
Finally, Pi commits to x
1
i and [c]i. It is worth noting here that no party knows
the value of c unless the commitments to all shares of c is opened.
For commitment, we use scheme picom(P1, P2, P3) depicted in Fig. 4 in the
whole paper unless noted otherwise. This commitment scheme is a three-party
protocol and based on Shamir’s secret sharing. It is of perfect hiding and per-
fect binding as we will show in Section 4.2. Furthermore, the scheme has other
properties as follows. First, it is uncommitment-symmetric: in the commitment
phase, one party (the committer) commits to the value, while in the uncommit-
ment phase, any party can uncommit the committed value. Second, it is addition
(substraction) homomorphic. That is, given commitments to a and b, it is easy
for each party to locally compute the commitments to a+b and a−b by adding or
substracting the corresponding shares. These two properties are straight-forward
to verify.
Protocol picom(P1, P2, P3)
Input: Pi holds a secret d ∈ {0, 1}k
Auxiliary Inputs: Prime p > 3 and p > 2k+1; Committer Pi, and verifiers Ph(i+1),
Ph(i+2) (i ∈ {1, 2, 3})
1. Commitment phase:
- Pi generates a polynomial f(x)←R Fp[X], with deg(f) ≤ t and f(0) = d
- Pi computes dj ← f(j) for j ∈ {1, 2, 3}
- Pi sends dh(i+1) to Ph(i+1), and dh(i+2) to Ph(i+2)
2. Uncommitment phase:
- For i ∈ {1, 2, 3}: Pi sends di to Ph(i+1) and Ph(i+2)
- For i ∈ {1, 2, 3}: Pi receives dh(i+1) from Ph(i+1), and dh(i+2) from Ph(i+2)
- Verifiers Ph(i+1) and Ph(i+2) do the verification as follows, respectively: re-
construct d(1) from d1 and d2, d
(2) from d2 and d3, d
(3) from d3 and d1, and
check whether d(1) = d(2) = d(3): if so get d← d(1); otherwise, abort.
Fig. 4. Commitment Scheme based on Shamir’s Secret Sharing
The detailed protocol of input preparation is shown in Fig. 5. Then after
every party executes its input preparation, Pi holds ([I1]i, [I2]i, [I3]i), and the
commitments to x1i and [c]i.
Circuit computation. The three parties cooperatively compute the func-
tion s times in parallel, using the prepared input sharings [Ii] (i ∈ {1, 2, 3})
and the sharing [c] of cut-and-choose indicator. Unlike the semi-honest setting,
the cut-and-choose indicator should be used in the malicious scenario to select
either the true or random inputs of the three parties, such that if the bit of c is
1, the inputs to the corresponding run are random inputs; otherwise, they are
the true inputs. Thus, we have to design a circuit (called input selection circuit)
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Input: Pi’s true input x
0
i ∈ {0, 1}ni−ni−1
Auxiliary Inputs: Statistics parameter s, circuit C = (n,m, q, F, S,G)
1. Generate input value:
- Generate random input: x1i ←R {0, 1}ni−ni−1
2. Generate input set:
- Generate permutation vector: (σi,1, · · · , σi,s)←R {0, 1}s
- Generate s copies of inputs: For j = 1 to s, Iij ← (xσiji , x1−σiji )
- Pi’s input set: Ii ← (Ii,1, · · · , Ii,s)
3. Generate input sharing:
- Generate s copies of input sharing:
For j = 1 to s, [Iij ]← ([xσiji ], [x1−σiji ])
- The sharing of Pi’s input set: [Ii]← ([Ii,1], · · · , [Ii,s])
- Send [Ii]h(i+1) to Ph(i+1), and [Ii]h(i+2) to Ph(i+2)
- Receive [Ih(i−1)]i from Ph(i−1), and [Ih(i−2)]i from Ph(i−2)
4. Generate indicator sharing:
- Generate a share of cut-and-choose indicator: [c]i ←R {0, 1}s
5. Commit values:
- Commit to x1i and [c]i
Fig. 5. Input Preparation of Pi (i ∈ {1, 2, 3})
for each run to select proper inputs using σij , Iij and c with i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and
j ∈ {1, · · · , s}.
Since for each σij , Iij = (x
σij
i , x
1−σij
i ), we have
x0i = (x
σij
i ⊕ x1−σiji )σij ⊕ xσiji (4)
x1i = (x
σij
i ⊕ x1−σiji )σij ⊕ x1−σiji (5)
Let c = (c(1), · · · , c(s)), where c(j) is the jth bit of c. For jth run, the input
selection circuit can be designed as follows.
xij = (x
0
i ⊕ x1i )c(j) ⊕ x0i (6)
where xij is the input of Pi picked up using the cut-and-choose indicator in the
jth run (i.e., if c(j) = 0 then xij = x
0
i ; otherwise, xij = x
1
i ).
Plug Eqs. (4) and (5) into Eq. (6), we then get
xij = (x
σij
i ⊕ x1−σiji )c(j) ⊕ (xσiji ⊕ x1−σiji )σij ⊕ xσiji (7)
= (x
σij
i ⊕ x1−σiji )(c(j) ⊕ σij)⊕ xσiji (8)
Concatenating the circuit represented by Eq. (8) to the circuit of the computed
function, the three parties can cooperatively decide the inputs (true or random)
to each run, without any party knowing anything about the decision.
Then, with each shared and decided copy of input, the three parties cooper-
atively compute the circuit of the computed function once. Each party records
the transcripts (values of all the wires) of all the s runs.
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Transcript commitment. Each party Pk commits to the transcript of ev-
ery run of the circuit. The transcript of a circuit C = (n,m, q, F, S,G) can be
described with all its wire states by a string t ∈ {0, 1}n+q. We let Pk stores its
transcript in an array T jk [1..n + q] for its jth run. Then, T
j
k [1..n] denotes the
input share of Pk, T
j
k [n+1..n+q−m] denotes the share of internal gate outputs
(called internal state share), and T jk [n + q −m + 1..n + q] denotes the output
share. Each party commit to its input share, interal state share and output share
for every run, respectively. That is, Each party commits to its share on every
wire in very run. These commitments make all parties cannot change their data
shares in the output generation.
Output generation. The three parties cooperatively generate the output
of the protocol as follows.
First, each party Pi opens the commitment to its share [c]i of the cut-and-
choose indicator, and reconstructs c = (c(1), · · · , c(s)).
Second, for each run with c(j) = 1, the commitments to the shares T jh(k+1)
[nk−1 + 1..nk] and T
j
h(k+2)[nk−1 + 1..nk] of each party Pk’s input (selected in
the input selection circuit) are opened, enabling Pk to reconstruct this input
and do consistence check by comparing the input with its random input. If the
reconstructed input value does not equal to its random input value, Pk aborts;
otherwise, Pk uncommits to T
j
i [nk−1 + 1..nk]. This forces the corrupted party to
follow the protocol to select random inputs for computation verification.
Third, for each run with c(j) = 1, each party Pk uncommits its internal state
share T jk [n+1..n+q−m] and output share T jk [n+q−m+1..n+q] for k ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
Then, each party Pi (i ∈ {1, 2, 3}) ensembles {T jk [1..n + q]}3k=1, and computes
all wire values T j [1..n+ q] = ⊕3k=1T jk [1..n+ q] of the circuit for the jth run, and
checks if the circuit computation is correct. If any error is found, Pk aborts.
Finally, for each run with c(j) = 0, the commitments to the output shares
T jk [n + q −m + 1..n + q] for k ∈ {1, 2, 3} are opened, and all the output values
are reconstructed by each party. Every party then checks if all the output values
are equal. If so, output the output value; otherwise, aborts.
Our detailed protocol is demonstrated in Fig. 6.
4.2 Security Analysis
In this section, we first show that the three-party commitment scheme in Fig.
4 is perfectly binding and perfectly hiding, and then show that our protocol is
information-theoretically secure against one malicious corruption.
Theorem 2 states the security of the commitment shceme picom(P1, P2, P3).
Theorem 2. Protocol picom(P1, P2, P3) is of perfect binding and perfect hiding
in the presence of a malicious adversary corrupting at most one of the parties.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that P1 is the committer and P2,
P3 are verifiers. Then, we consider the cases where P1 is corrupted and where
P2 is corrupted. (the cases of P2 and P3 are essentially symmetric).
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Protocol pimal3PC(P1, P2, P3)
a
Input: Pi’s holds input x
0
i ∈ {0, 1}ni−ni−1 with i ∈ {1, 2, 3}
Auxiliary Inputs: Statistics parameter s, a circuit C = (n,m, q, F, S,G) represent-
ing the computed functionality
1. Input preparation:
For i ∈ {1, 2, 3}:
- Pi do input preparation (see Fig. 5), and finally holds ([I1]i, [I2]i, [I3]i), [c]i,
and commitments to [x0i ], x
1
i , [c]i
2. Circuit computation:
- Select proper inputs:
For i ∈ {1, 2, 3}: For j ∈ {1, · · · , s}: For k ∈ {1, 2, 3}:
 Pk computes [tij ]k ← [xσiji ]k ⊕ [x1−σiji ]k
 If i = k then, Pk computes [c(j)]k ← [c(j)]k ⊕ σij
 Compute [tijc(j)]k as follows:
◦ Pk generates ri,j,k ∈R {0, 1}s
◦ Pk sends [tij ]k, [c(j)]k and ri,j,k to Ph(k+1)
◦ Pk receives [tij ]h(k−1), [c(j)]h(k−1) and ri,j,h(k−1) from Ph(k−1)
◦ Pk computes [tijc(j)]k ← [tij ]k[c(j)]k ⊕ [tij ]k[c(j)]h(k−1)
⊕ [tij ]h(h−1)[c(j)]k ⊕ ri,j,k ⊕ ri,j,h(k−1)
 Pk computes [xij ]k ← [tijc(j)]k ⊕ [xσiji ]k
- Compute the circuit:
Now, parties Pk (k ∈ {1, 2, 3}) hold ([x1j ]k, [x2j ]k, [x3j ]k) (j ∈ {1, · · · , s}) as
inputs. Let xj = x1j ||x2j ||x3j , then xj ∈ {0, 1}n. The input bits {xj}s can
be regarded as an n × s bit matrix. Letting vw ∈ {0, 1}s (w ∈ {1, · · · , n})
denote the wth column of the matrix input to input wire w, the input can
be written as {vw}n. The circuit with s copies of inputs can be computed in
parallel as follows.
For k ∈ {1, 2, 3}: For j ∈ {1, · · · , s}: T jk [1..n]← [x1j ]k||[x2j ]k||[x3j ]k
For g ∈ {n+ 1, · · · , n+ q}: a← F (g), b← S(g)
 If g is XOR gate: For i ∈ {1, 2, 3}: [δs(g)]i ← [δs(a)]i ⊕ [δs(b)]i
 If g is AND gate (see Fig. 3): For i ∈ {1, 2, 3}:
◦ Pi generates ri ∈R {0, 1}s
◦ Pi sends [δs(a)]i, [δs(b)]i and ri to Ph(i+1)
◦ Pi receives [δs(a)]h(i−1), [δs(b)]h(i−1) and rh(i−1) from Ph(i−1)
◦ Pi computes [δs(g)]i ← [δs(a)]i[δs(b)]i ⊕ [δs(a)]i[δs(b)]h(i−1)
⊕ [δs(a)]h(i−1)[δs(b)]i ⊕ ri ⊕ rh(i−1)
 Let δs(g) = (δ1(g), · · · , δs(g)). For k ∈ {1, 2, 3}: For j ∈ {1, · · · , s}:
T jk [g]← [δj(g)]k
3. Transcript commitment:
For k ∈ {1, 2, 3}: For j ∈ {1, · · · , s}:
- Pk commits to T
j
k [1..n] corresponding to input wires
- Pk commits to T
j
k [n+ 1..n+ q −m] corresponding to internal gate outputs
- Pk commits to T
j
k [n+ q −m+ 1..n+ q] corresponding to output wires
a In this protocol, both AND and XOR operations are bitwise, if one or both
operands are bit strings.
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4. Output generation:
- Construct cut-and-choose indicator: each party Pi uncommits shares [c]i for
i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and gets: c = (c(1), · · · , c(s))
- Check random inputs: For j ∈ {1, · · · , s}: If c(j) = 1 then: For k ∈ {1, 2, 3}:
 Ph(k+1) uncommits T jh(k+1)[nk−1 + 1..nk]
 Ph(k+2) uncommits T jh(k+2)[nk−1 + 1..nk]
 Pk checks whether
xjk = T
j
1 [nk−1 + 1..nk]⊕ T j2 [nk−1 + 1..nk]⊕ T j3 [nk−1 + 1..nk]
If not so, Pk aborts; Otherwise, Pk uncommits T
j
k [nk−1 + 1..nk]
- Check circuit computation: For j ∈ {1, · · · , s}: If c(j) = 1 then:
For k ∈ {1, 2, 3}: Pk uncommits T jk [n+1..n+q−m] and T jk [n+q−m+1..n+q]
For k ∈ {1, 2, 3}:
 Pk ensembles T ji [1..n+ q] for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}
 Pk computes T j [1..n + q] = ⊕3k=1T jk [1..n + q], and checks if the circuit
computation is correct. If any error is found, Pk aborts.
- Construct outputs:
 For j ∈ {1, · · · , s}: If c(j) = 0 then: For k ∈ {1, 2, 3}:
Pk uncommits T
j
k [n+ q −m+ 1..n+ q]
 For j ∈ {1, · · · , s}: If c(j) = 0 then: For k ∈ {1, 2, 3}:
Pk computes yj = ⊕3i=1T ji [n+ q −m+ 1..n+ q]
 For k ∈ {1, 2, 3}: Pk checks if all yj with c(j) = 0 are equal. If not so,
aborts; otherwise, output any yj with c
(j) = 0 as the common output.
Fig. 6. Our 3PC protocol from cut-and-choose in the presence of a malicious adversary
corrupting a party
If P1 is corrupted, the honest verifiers P2 and P3 will hold two shares of
the committed data d, which will uniquely determine d due to Shamir’s secret
sharing, and P1 cannot open the commitment to any other value except the
original value committed in the uncommitment phase. Thus, perfect binding
holds.
If P2 is corrupted, it receives a share of d in the commitment phase, which
is a uniformly random number in Fp and carries no information about d. Thus
the perfect hiding holds. 
The Theorem 3 states the security of our 3PC protocol with malicious secu-
rity.
Theorem 3. Protocol pimal3PC(P1, P2, P3) is secure in the presence of a malicious
adversary corrupting at most one of the parties, and achieves a cheating proba-
bility 2−s where s is the statistical parameter.
Proof. Given that the commitment scheme picom(P1, P2, P3) is of perfect binding
and perfect hiding, it is obvious that all the messages caused by commitments
can be perfectly simulated, and the commitment data cannot be changed once it
is committed. Thus, in the simulation following, we omit the simulation of mes-
14 Zhili Chen
sages caused by commitments, and use the three-party commitment protocol as
an ideal functionality.
Since the three parties are symmetric in the protocol, we consider only the
case where P1 is corrupted. We show that the real and simulated interactions
are indistinguishable to all environments, in every part of the protocol. Recall
that the view of an environment consists of messages sent from honest parties
to the corrupted party, as well as the final outputs of the parties.
– Input sharing. In this phase, P1 receives [I2]1 from honest P2, and [I3]1
from honest P3. This can be simulated with two uniformly random bit string
of the same bit lengths as the two received messages. Specifically, message
[I2]1 = (([x
σ2,1
2 ]1, [x
1−σ2,1
2 ]1), · · · , ([xσ2,s2 ]1, [x1−σ2,s2 ]1)) can be simulated with
a random string t1 ∈ {0, 1}s|x02|, while message [I3]1 = (([xσ3,13 ]1, [x1−σ3,13 ]1),
· · · , ([xσ3,s3 ]1, [x1−σ3,s3 ]1)) can be simulated with a random string t2 ∈ {0, 1}s|x
0
3|.
Due to the XOR secret sharing used, the real and simulated views are iden-
tically distributed.
– Circuit computation. This phase comprises two steps:
• Select proper inputs.
P1 receives {([t1,j ]3, [t2,j ]3, [t3,j ]3)}sj=1, [c]3 and {(r1,j,3, r2,j,3, r3,j,3)}sj=1
where [t1,j ]3||[t2,j ]3||[t3,j ]3, r1,j,3||r2,j,3||r3,j,3 ∈ {0, 1}n, [c]3 ∈ {0, 1}s and
[ti,j ]3 = [x
σi,j
i ]3 ⊕ [x1−σi,ji ]3 for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and j ∈ {1, · · · , s}. These
messages are all uniformly random strings for P1, except that [x
σ1,j
1 ]3 and
[x
1−σ1,j
1 ]3 had been generated by P1 and thus [t1,j ]3 is known exactly
to P1. Therefore, these messages can be simulated with strings t1 ∈R
{0, 1}ns, t2 ∈R {0, 1}s and t3 ∈R {0, 1}ns, respectively, with a restraint
that substrings [t1,j ]3 are fixed in the correponding places of t1. This
way, the real and simulated views of all environments are identical.
• Compute the circuit.
This can be simulated gate by gate until the computation is completed.
Given a current gate, it is simulated in terms of its operation as follows.
∗ XOR: Party Pi sends or receives nothing, so there is nothing to be
simulated.
∗ AND : Let a, b ∈ {0, 1}s denote the two input bit strings to the gate.
Let ri, rh(i−1) ∈ {0, 1}s be the two uniformly random bit strings
generated by Pi and Ph(i−1) for the AND computation, respectively.
During the gate computation, Pi receives [a]h(i−1), [b]h(i−1) and rh(i−1)
from Ph(i−1). From the circuit computation of the protocol, we can
see that {[a]k}3k=1 and {[b]k}3k=1 are all independent random vari-
ables subject to a = ⊕3k=1[a]k and b = ⊕3k=1[b]k. Thus, the three mes-
sages can again be simulated by three uniformly random bit strings.
Both the real and simulated views are also identical.
Thus, the entire phase of circuit computation can be perfectly simulated.
– Transcript commitment. This phase can be perfectly simulated due to
the perfect hiding of the commitment scheme.
– Output generation. This phase make sure that any deviation from the
protocol can be detected except with negligible probability in statistical pa-
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rameter s, making use of the perfect binding of the commitment scheme
used.
• Construct cut-and-choose indicator: The protocol either open the shares
correctly, and thus all parties can construct c, or is aborted for some
cheating detected. Namely, once all the shares of c is committed, they
cannot be modifed in all runs of computation.
• Check random inputs: The protocol either properly selects the random
inputs as inputs to runs for computation verification, or is aborted for
some cheating detected. This makes sure that all runs for computation
verification should use random inputs, otherwise the protocol will be
aborted and noting is revealed.
• Verify circuit computation: The protocol either successfully verify the
correctness of all the runs for computation verification, or is aborted
for some cheating detected. This makes sure all runs for computation
verification are correctly performed.
• Construct output: The protocol either correctly constructs the outputs,
or is aborted for some cheating detected. This makes sure that all runs
for output computation are consistently performed.
From the above, we can see that for semi-honest adversaries, the protocol
would be carried out successfully; for malicious adversaries, any cheating would
be caught except with a negligible probability and the protocol would be aborted.
In a word, all environments’ real and simulated views are indistinguishable.
To cheat successfully, the adversary has to guess the value of c, thus the
cheating probability is 2−s. 
4.3 Efficiency Discussion
Now we discuss the efficiency of the proposed protocol. The computation com-
plexity is mild since there are no cryptographic operations, and most of the
operations are bitwise XOR and AND computations. The communication com-
plexity is reduced compared to the counterparts based on verifiable secret shar-
ing. Specifically, the communication round amounts to the depth of the circuit
plus a constant number, while that of the protocols based on verifiable secret
sharing may be several times of the circuit depth.
5 Practical Considerations of Our Protocol
In practical scenarios, malicious security may be much stronger than actual
security demand. For example, if a protocol ensuring that 99.5% of all cheatings
are caught is sufficient for practical applications, the a covert security level fixing
s = 8 can be used, and the protocol is converted into covertly secure one with
deterrent 1−2−8. In other words, we can fix s properly at a small value according
to practical requirements, and get a protocol with appropriate deterrent.
Furthermore, at most of the time in practice, computational security is
enough. Thus, the unifromly random bits can be generated by a pseudo-random
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generator, and the commitments to the transcripts of s runs can be replaced
with the commitments to hash values of the transcripts, degrading the original
information-theoretically secure protocol to a computationally secure one, but
with a better efficiency.
6 Conclusion
In this work, we apply cut-and-choose idea in the information-theoretic setting to
construct a maliciously secure protocol for three-party computations (3PC) with
one corruption. This yields an efficient and information-theoretically secure 3PC
protocol for Boolean circuit computation. Asymptotically, we achieve a cheating
probability of 2−s where s is the number of runs of circuit computation. This
is similar to the setting where cut-and-choose technique is used based on Yao’s
garbled circuits [Lin13].
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